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Jose Padilla and Martha Stewart: Who
Should Be Charged with Criminal Conduct?
Ellen S. Podgor*
I.

Introduction

Prosecutorial discretion plays an important role in deciding who
will be charged with criminal conduct, and what, if any charges will be
pursued.1 As a result of numerous factors, prosecutorial power has
expanded in recent years. For one, there is an increased number of
federal criminal statutes.2 Further, broad interpretations of these statutes
play a key role in offering new options for prosecutors as they exercise
their discretion.3 Prosecutors also have the liberty to charge "cover-up"
crimes, 4 such as making false statements or obstructing justice, as
opposed to proceeding against the underlying conduct. Additionally,
prosecutors have significant leeway in pursuing extraterritorial conduct
and they may now proceed against conduct that at one time may have
* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. The author thanks
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law where an earlier draft of this paper served as the
basis for a speech given as part of its Criminal Justice Forum. Thanks also go to
participants in the Criminal Justice Forum for their comments on a draft of this paper and
to Russ Weaver for organizing this conference. Finally, thanks go to research assistant
Shannon Vamer Alexander.
1. See Richard Bloom, Prosecutorial Discretion, 87 GEO L.J. 1267 (1999); Ellen S.
Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing "Discretionary Justice," 13
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 167 (2004); Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics andProfessionalism

of Prosecutorsin DiscretionaryDecisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1511 (2000).
2. See infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 15-33 and accompanying text.
4. See generally Kathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life
and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357 (2003) (explaining how the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act provided prosecutors with new mechanisms for prosecuting fraud);
Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen's Fall from Grace, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 917 (2003)
(explaining how a recently enacted witness tampering statute allowed the government to
charge Andersen with obstruction of justice despite the fact that no legal proceedings
were pending at the time that documents were destroyed); Stuart P. Green, Uncovering
the Cover-up Crime, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005); Geraldine Szott Moohr,
An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in Preventing CorporateCrime, 55
FLA. L. REv. 937 (2003).
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been left to civil actions. Finally, the administration's decision to
proceed outside the criminal justice process through use of the "enemy
combatant" status has offered prosecutor's an additional option.5
In examining new dimensions to prosecutorial discretion, this paper
looks at the exercise of discretion in two instances: (1) the designation of
Jose Padilla as an enemy combatant; 6 and (2) the charging of Martha
Stewart with criminal conduct. 7 It asks whether it was proper to proceed
outside the judicial process with Jose Padilla and whether Martha
Stewart should have been charged with a crime. 8
II.
A.

Expanded Prosecutorial Discretion
IncreasedFederalLegislation

On May 11, 1998, in an address to the 75th Annual American Law
Institute Meeting, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist described the
burden on the federal system of justice caused by over-federalization. 9
He repeated earlier criticisms of "Congress and the President for their
propensity to enact more and more legislation, which brings more and
more cases into the federal court system. "'
The impact of federalization on the criminal justice process received
heightened consideration when the American Bar Association appointed
a task force to examine this issue in 1998. The ABA Report on the
"Federalization of Criminal Law," a report from a committee chaired by
Edwin Meese, III and William W. Taylor, Ii, stressed the "dramatic
increase in the number and variety of federal crimes."1 1 A startling
statistic from this Report was that "of all federal crimes enacted since
1865, over forty percent [were] created since 1970."' 12 The Report told
of how new crimes are added to the role of federal criminality "not
because federal prosecution of these crimes is necessary but because
' 3
federal crime legislation in general is thought to be politically popular."
5. See infra notes 56-74 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Section IV.
9. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at the 75th Annual American Law
Institute Meeting (May 11, 1998) (on file with author), also excerpted in Chief Justice
Raises Concerns on Federalization,30 THE THIRD BRANCH (Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, Washington D.C.), June, 1998, at 1, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/jun98ttb/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
10. Id.
11. James A. Strazzella, The Federalization of Criminal Law, 1998 A.B.A. CRIM.
JUST. SEC. 2.
12. .Id.
13. Id. See also generally James Strazzella, The Federal Role in Criminal Law, 543
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The dismay with increased federalization is not unique to one
political party. It is a problem seen by groups espousing a wide array of
political and ideological views. For example, the Heritage Foundation
has a special group that regularly meets to discuss overcriminalization
concerns.1 4 Likewise, the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (NACDL) notes overfederalization as one of its missions,
"urg[ing] Congress to reject its tendency to federalize crime and repeal
legislation that is contrary to our system of federalism and sound crime
control policy.

,1 5

In a 1998 article, then NACDL President Gerald B.

Lefcourt, National District Attorneys Association President William L.
Murphy, and ABA Criminal Justice Section Chair Ronald Goldstock
stated that,
[c]riminal and social problems are increasingly being addressed by
the Congress with what many have come to regard as a purely
political response-calls to federalize more criminal activity and to
lengthen already unwieldy prison terms.... There can be little doubt

that increased federal prosecutive authority has adversely affected the
Department of Justice's ability to fulfill its role of enforcing
16
traditional federal offenses ....
B.

OverbroadFederalStatutes

The increase in new legislation, permitting increased federal
prosecution, is not the only cause of overfederalization and
overcriminalization.
There is also legislation that lacks sufficient
specificity, allowing prosecutors to use federal statutes to bring conduct
that is normally handled by state and local bodies into the federal
system. 17
Generic statutes allow federal prosecutors discretion to proceed
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC,. 9 (1996) (providing a broad overview of the

influence that federal legislation and federal courts have on criminal law and introducing

articles on the topic by other commentators).
14. See Paul Rosenzweig, The Over-Criminalization of Social and Economic
Conduct, HERITAGE FOUND. POL'Y RES. & ANALYSIS (April 17, 2003), at

http://www.heritage.org/Research/Legallssues/lm7.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2005); see
also http://www.overcriminalized.com/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2005).
15. National Association of Criminal Defense, Legislation: Overfederalization, at
http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/overcriminalization (last visited Feb. 15,
2005).
16. Ronald Goldstock, Gerald Lefcourt & William Murphy, Justice That Makes
Sense, 21 CHAMPION 6, 7-8 (1997).
17. In some cases these statutes are subject to challenges for being vague. See
generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960); Robert Batey, Vagueness and the
Construction of CriminalStatutes-BalancingActs, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1 (1997).
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criminally against conduct that might normally be considered state or
local criminal activity. For example, the mail fraud statute, 18 an 1872
federal statute that was focused on re-codifying the Postal Act and
criminalizing lottery schemes that used the postal system, allows for
federal prosecution of a wide array of conduct. 19 Jed Rakoff, now a
federal district court judge, has called the mail fraud statute the
prosecutor's "Stradivarius" or "Colt 45. "20 Schemes to defraud, whether
they involve diet drug fraud,2' "divorce mill" fraud,2 2 or securities
fraud,23 may lead to charges of mail fraud when there is some mailing, no
matter how "routine" or "innocent" the mailing might be.24 The
Supreme Court has stated that the mailing does not have to be an
essential part of the scheme to defraud.2 5
Equally permissive is the wire fraud statute, a law that was modeled
after the mail fraud statute, although enacted in 1952.26 Even when the
wire used as the basis for the prosecution passes from one place within a
state to another place within the same state, wire fraud may be charged if
the wire happened to have passed, unbeknownst to the sender, outside
the state.
Prosecutors also have enormous discretion to bring criminal charges
for conspiracy to defraud, which Justice Learned Hand referred to as the
"darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery. 2 8 Under the generic
conspiracy statute, prosecutors can bring charges of conspiracy to
commit a specific offense or a conspiracy to defraud the government.
When conspiracy to defraud is alleged, there are few restraints on the
government's ability to prosecute. 29 As noted by Professor Abraham

18. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2005).
19. See Ellen S. Podgor, Mail Fraud: Opening Letters, 43 S. C. L. REv. 223 (1992);
Ellen S. Podgor, Do We Need a "Beanie Baby" FraudStatute?, 49 AM. U. L. REv. 1031

(2000).
20. Jed S. Rakoff, The FederalMail FraudStatute, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 771, 771 (1980).
21. See United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423 (2nd Cir. 1966).
22. See United States v. Edwards, 458 F.2d 875, 878 (5th Cir. 1972).
23. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
24. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 715 (1989) (stating that the Court's
precedents do not preclude routine and innocent mailings from fulfilling the mailing
element of the mail fraud statute and citing Carpenter,484 U.S. at 28, in support); see
also Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1954) (explaining that the mailing does not
need to be contemplated as an essential element of the fraud and that one can be found to
have caused a mailing even if he did not intend to do so, but knew or could foresee that
the mails would be used in the ordinary course of business).
25. See Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 711.
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2005).
27. See United States v. Bryant, 766 F.2d 370, 375 (8th Cir. 1985).
28. Harrison v. United States, 7 F.2d 259, 263 (2nd Cir. 1925).
29. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (2005). There is detailed information related to the scope
of acceptable prosecutorial conduct in the Notes and Decisions, Section VII.
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Goldstein, "[t]he phrase [conspiracy to defraud] has had no fixed
meaning. 30
Congress sometimes increases the possibility of new conduct being
covered by existing statutes through statutory amendments that are
tacked onto legislation that has no relationship to the amendment. For
example, Congress increased the scope of the mail fraud statute in an
amendment included in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, where
Congress defined a scheme or artifice to defraud to include "a scheme' or
31
artifice to deprive another of the 'intangible right of honest services. ,'
Congress went even further when it added in 1994, as part of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, that mail fraud would
no longer require a mailing.32 Mail fraud charges may now be brought if
the accused deposits or causes to be deposited "any matter or thing
whatever33 to be sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate
carrier.

Courts have imposed some limits when executive discretion appears
to stretch a statute beyond its intent. For example, in the case of United
States v. Brown,34 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing a
mail fraud conviction, stated that "the fraud statutes do not cover all
behavior which strays from the ideal; Congress has not yet criminalized
all sharp conduct, manipulative acts, or unethical transactions. 3 5 Courtimposed limits, such as those imposed on the mail fraud statute,
however, are not a commonplace occurrence.
C. Statutes ChargingExtraneous Conduct
In addition to an increased number of federal criminal statutes, and
the enormous breadth of many statutes that allow for a wide range of
conduct to be prosecuted, prosecutors have an additional tool: crimes that
do not explicitly relate to the conduct under investigation, but arise as a
result of the investigation itself. These crimes, sometimes termed
6636
cover-up"
crimes, include offenses such as making false statements, 37
30. Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J.
405, 417 (1959). See also Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Fraud,48 AM. U. L. REv. 729, 73031(1999).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2005).
32. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
§ 250006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2087 (1994).
33. Id.
34. United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1550 (1 th Cir. 1996).
35. Id. at 1562.
36. See generally Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond, supra note 4;
Brickey, Andersen's Fallfrom Grace, supra note 4; Green, supra note 4; Moohr, supra
note 4.
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000).
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39

38
obstructing justice, and committing perjury.
Prosecutors need tools to protect witnesses providing information
during an investigation. They also need tools to protect the evidence that
is the subject of the investigation, as receiving truthful information
before a grand jury is important in criminal prosecutions.
An individual who lies to a government investigator is subject to a
charge of making a false statement under the false statement statute.40
Likewise, committing perjury and making a false declaration are charges
used when someone does not testify truthfully in a court or provides
conflicting statements. 4' Finally, obstruction of justice is a charge used
when someone destroys documents, intimidates witnesses, or impedes
the government's investigation of a matter. 42
Often, these statutes are easier to satisfy than statutes addressing the
actual criminal conduct.4 3 Thus, there is a strong advantage if the
prosecution can proceed under one of these statutes, as opposed to
proceeding directly against the criminal conduct that was the subject of
the initial investigation.

D.

ExtraterritorialProsecutions

As a result of globalization, there is a wider range of conduct that
can be prosecuted in the federal system.4 4 Prosecutors may prosecute
extraterritorial conduct when the company or activity involved in the
alleged criminality is entirely outside the United States.4 5 In some
instances, the statutes focus specifically on the extraterritorial conduct, as
with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 46 In other instances, however,
the statute may fail to specify whether extraterritorial conduct may be
prosecuted, and prosecutors may proceed premised on a theory of
objective territoriality, a theory that permits prosecution of conduct that
"effects" the United States.47 In a globalized world, conduct that might
38. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1520 (2000).
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000).
41. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1623 (2000).
42. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (2004).
43. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 416 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
("The prospect remains that an overzealous prosecutor or investigator-aware that a
person has committed some suspicious acts, but unable to make a criminal case-will
create a crime by surprising the suspect, asking about those acts, and receiving a false
denial."); Martha Stewart Misgivings, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 2004, at A16.
44. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, "Defensive Territoriality": A New Paradigmfor
the Prosecutionof ExtraterritorialBusiness Crimes, 31 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2002).
45. See United States v. Nippon Paper Indus, Co., 109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997).
46. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I (2000).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Larsen, 952 F.2d 1099, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1991); Chua
Han Mow v. United States. 730 F.2d 1308, 1311-12 (9th Cir. 1984).
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previously have had little influence on the United States may now easily
rise to the level of having an "effect" on the country.4 8
E.

Civil v. CriminalProsecution

Prosecutorial discretion, thus, is in part a function of the increased
number of statutes available for prosecuting conduct, the existence of
overbroad statutes that allow for a wide range of conduct to be subject to
federal prosecution, and extraterritorial application that allows not only
for state and local conduct, but also international conduct to be the
subject of a criminal prosecution in the United States. Another factor is
whether an individual is charged with criminal conduct or whether the
activity might fall outside the criminal justice system.
Prosecutors often have the discretion to proceed with either criminal
or civil actions and, in many instances, they have the option to proceed
with both. This is particularly true with tax cases,49 securities matters,5 °
and antitrust actions. 51 All of the statutes covering these areas of law not
only provide for civil remedies, but also permit criminal actions. Some
statutes place a higher burden on the government in criminal matters,
such as requiring an explicit mens rea of willfulness.52 Clearly, when
proceeding criminally, a prosecutor also has the added burden of proving
his or her case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Professors John Coffee 53 and Kenneth Mann 54 have written about
activity that falls within both the criminal and civil spheres. As stated by
Professor Coffee, "the criminal sanction has been applied broadly, and
sometimes thoughtlessly, to a broad range of essentially civil obligations,
some of which were intended as aspirational standards
and others which
55
are inherently open-ended and evolving in character.,

48. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on November 9, 2004 regarding
"whether application of the common law revenue rule puts beyond the reach of the
federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, the use of interstate wires for the purpose of
executing a scheme to defraud a foreign sovereign of its property rights in accrued tax
revenue." United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124
S. Ct. 1875 (2004).
49. See, e.g., United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 311 (1978).
50. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
52. See, e.g., Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 344 (1965) (examining § 7201
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954).
53. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., ParadigmsLost: The Blurringof the Criminaland
Civil Law Models - And What Can Be DoneAbout It, 101 YALEL.J. 1875 (1992).
54. See, e.g., Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795 (1992).
55. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the
DisappearingTort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 201 (1991).
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ProceedingOutside the CriminalJustice Process

A relatively unused avenue, until recently, was for the government
to proceed outside the criminal justice process by not bringing criminal
charges, but by holding an individual as an "enemy combatant." In the
recent Supreme Court decision of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court
considered, inter alia, whether the government had the authority to hold
a United States citizen as an enemy combatant.56 Hamdi, who was
detained and interrogated in Afghanistan, was transferred to the United
States naval base in Guantanamo in January 2002. Upon finding that he
was an American citizen, the government transferred him to a naval brig
in Norfolk, Virginia, where he remained until sent to a brig in
Charleston, South Carolina.5 7 The government maintained that Hamdi
could be held indefinitely as an enemy combatant. 8
As a result of a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed by
Hamdi's father, the Supreme Court reviewed this custodial arrangement.
The Court cited a post-September 11 Congressional action authorizing
the use of military force as the basis for holding Hamdi as an enemy
combatant. It ruled that the government could, in fact, hold as enemy
combatants "individual[s] who, it alleges, [were] 'part of or supporting
forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners' in Afghanistan
and who 'engaged in an armed conflict against the United States'
there., 59 Although the Court held that there is "no bar to this Nation's
holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant," it is necessary
to determine that the individual is, in fact, an enemy combatant. 60 The
Court stated that "due process demands that a citizen held in the United
States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to
contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision
maker., 61 "[A] citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as
an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut
the Government's factual
62
assertions before a neutral decision maker."
Hamdi's case is another example of the government's enormous
discretion in deciding whether to proceed outside the criminal process.
Originally held as an enemy combatant, he was eventually released by
the government and sent to Saudi Arabia upon forfeiture of his U.S.

56.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635 (2004) (plurality opinion).

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 2636.
Id.
Id. at 2639.
Id. at 2640.
Id. at 2625.

62.

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004) (plurality opinion).
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citizenship.63
In the case of John Walker Lindh, prosecutors elected not to go
outside of the criminal justice process.64 Lindh eventually pled guilty in
the Eastern District of Virginia District Court for the crimes of supplying
services to the Taliban and of "carrying an explosive during the
commission of a felony.', 65 He received a sentence, pursuant to a plea
agreement, of twenty years.6 6 Concern about the possibility of the
government proceeding outside the criminal justice process is noted in
the Lindh plea agreement, which explicitly states that "the United States
agrees to forego any right it has to treat the defendant as an unlawful
enemy combatant" unless the defendant engages in future terrorist
conduct.67
1.

Jose Padilla

Jose Padilla, an individual against whom the government proceeded
outside the criminal justice process, falls within this last category. Jose
Padilla was born in Brooklyn, New York. He had a checkered criminal
background as a youth; he had been arrested in Florida, and at one point,
had been considered a gang member in Chicago.6 8 He was born a
Catholic, but converted to Islam when he married a Middle Eastern
woman. On May 8, 2002, he stepped off of a plane coming from
Pakistan, via Zurich, at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport and
was
69
held by federal agents at the Chicago airport as a material witness.
To date, Jose Padilla has never been charged with a crime in the
United States. He was initially moved to New York where he was
appointed counsel, but was later moved to a brig in South Carolina,
where he was deprived of his right to see his attorney. Padilla remains in
custody on the South Carolina brig.
The Supreme Court chose not to consider Padilla's habeas corpus

63. See Joel Brinkley, From Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia, via Guantanamo, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, at A4.
64. See Guy Taylor, Top Court Hears 'Enemy Combatant' Case; Lawyers Urge
Criminal Trialfor U.S. Citizens, WASH. TIMES, April 29, 2004, at A04.
65. Plea Agreement at 1, U.S. v. Lindh, No. 02-37A (E.D. Va.), available at
http://news.findlaw.comihdocs/docs/lindh/uslindh71502pleaag.pdf (last visited Feb. 19,
2005).
66. Id. at 2.
67. Id. at 9. The plea agreement in the Lindh case came under scrutiny when the
government decided that Hamdi could be released. See John Walker Lindh is Asking
PresidentBush to Reduce His 20-Year Prison Sentence After Being Convicted of Helping
the Taliban (NPR radio broadcast, Sept. 29, 2004).
68. See Jodi Wilgoren, Traces of Terror: The Bomb Suspect: From Chicago Gang to
PossibleAl Qaeda Ties, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at A19.
69. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (2004).
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claim on the grounds that the matter was not brought in the proper
jurisdiction.7 ° Although the dismissal was without prejudice, it required
Padilla's case to proceed before the District of South Carolina, as
opposed to the Southern District of New York. This took place on June
2, 2004. On February 28, 2005, the District of South Carolina ruled that
Padilla would be released if the government failed to "bring criminal
charges against" him or to "hold him as a material witness. 71
Although we have no knowledge of what crime Jose Padilla
allegedly committed, if any, Deputy Attorney General James Comey
chose to issue a public statement on June 1, 2004, just twenty-eight days
before the issuance of an opinion by the Supreme Court.72 In his
statement, Comey said that if the Justice Department had proceeded
criminally against Padilla, he probably would not have talked because
"he would very likely have followed his lawyer's advice and said
nothing," and thus the government would not have obtained any
information.73 Without trial, without conviction, and without due
process of law, Comey said that Padilla was a trained Al Queda soldier
bent on "waging war against innocent civilians. 74
Many questions are raised by the prosecutorial treatment of Jose
Padilla. For example, was Padilla any different from John Walker Lindh,
who was allowed to have counsel? Was he any different from Lindh in
that he grew up in a poor community, as opposed to a middle-class
family? Why can one case fall outside the judicial process while the
other proceeds within? Why did the Justice Department trust the
attorneys in one case to get the information they desired and distrust the
attorneys in the other case? Finally, if enemy combatants are as
treacherous as described by the government, why did the government
agree to release Hamdi, even if it was more than two years after his
capture?
2.

Martha Stewart

In contrast, Martha Stewart, clearly not the terrorist type, was
prosecuted within our judicial process. She was charged with extraneous
or "cover-up ' 75 conduct. As opposed to charging her with insider
70.

Id.

71.

See Padilla v. Hanft, 2005 WL 465691, at * 13 (D. S.C. 2005).

72. Deputy Attorney General James Comey, Remarks Regarding Jose Padilla (June
1, 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2004/dag6104.htm (last visited
Feb. 19, 2005).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See supra note 4. See also Ellen S. Podgor, Arthur Andersen, LLP, and Martha
Stewart: Should Materiality be an Element of Obstructionof Justice?, 44 WASHBURN L.J.

2005]

JOSE PADILLA AND MARTHA STEWART

1069

trading, the conduct for which she was being investigated, prosecutors
presented evidence that eventually led to Stewart's conviction of an
alleged scheme to obstruct justice and make false statements.7 6 Less
known and discussed by the press is the civil suit filed by the Securities
and Exchange Commission against Martha Stewart and Peter
Bacanovic.77 This civil action asks for remedies, such as disgorgement
of the profits from the sale of ImClone stock, a stock that eventually
went up in value.78
In the criminal action, Stewart received a jury conviction, a fivemonth jail sentence, followed by a five-month house arrest and two
year's probation, and a $30,000 fine.79 Some claim that this sentence is
too lenient, while others are horrified by its harshness. As noted in a
headline in the Christian Science Monitor, "Stewart's Sentence Leaves
Few Satisfied."80
U.S. Attorney David Kelley claimed that Stewart was prosecuted in
order to protect "the integrity of this system."'', The bottom line,
however, is that Martha Stewart was never prosecuted for the criminal
acts for which she was initially under investigation. This is also an
example of the government proceeding both civilly and criminally
against the same defendant. Prosecutorial discretion permitted this to
happen.
IV. Common Themes
Both the Martha Stewart prosecution and the failure to prosecute
Jose Padilla revolve around the government's desire to obtain
(forthcoming 2005).
76. U.S. v. Stewart, No. SI 03 Cr. 717 (S.D.N.Y.), superseding indictment, available
at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mstewart/usmspb10504sind.pdf (last visited Mar.
19, 2005). See also Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, ProsecutingMartha: The
Use (andAbuse?) of Federal ProsecutorialPower, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 1107 (2005).
77. Complaint, SEC v. Stewart, No. 03 CV 4070 (S.D.N.Y.), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/mstewart/secmspb60403cmp.html (last visited Feb.
19, 2005); see also Joan Macleod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart? Observations About
Equal Justice in U.S. Insider Trading Regulation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247 (2003).
78. See Reuters, ImClone Swings to a Profit, CNN MONEY, July 21, 2004, at
http://money.cnn.com/2004/07/2 1/news/midcaps/imclone.reut/index.htm
(last visited
Feb. 19, 2005).
79. See Constance L. Hays, 5 Months in Jail, and Stewart Vows, "I'll Be Back,"
N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2004, at Al. On March 18, 2005, the Second Circuit sent the
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information.
According to Deputy Attorney General Comey, the
government obtained information from Padilla by depriving him of an
attorney, denying him due process and by proceeding outside of the
judicial process.
Likewise, in the case of Martha Stewart, the government wanted
information and called on her to speak before the Securities and
Exchange Commission. She went, and she talked, but they did not like
what was said. Therefore, they proceeded to charge her with crimes
related to lying instead of proceeding exclusively in the civil sphere or
charging the substantive crimes for which they were initially
investigating her.
These two cases reflect a failure in our legal system. If we believe
the government, the system fails because it cannot accommodate
criminal charges when information is needed. As such, the judicial
process is circumvented, with no satisfaction or relief provided to the
public or to the uncharged individuals. The system also fails because
undesired information produces extraneous charges, as opposed to
charges for what is initially being investigated. Here, the judicial process
is skewed with criminal punishments that are levied for conduct that, if
improper, could have easily been left in the civil arena. Both failures are
the result of a system of broad prosecutorial discretion that demands
considerable oversight.

